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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC-05300-86/1
26 November 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution

FROM:

Acting National Intelligence Officer for Europe

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SUBJECT: November Warning and Forecast Report

1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our warning meeting held on 19 November 1986.

2. Next month's warning meeting will be held on Wednesday, 17 December 1986 at 1025 in room 7-E-62, CIA Headquarters. Please telephone attendance plans to our office and have clearances certified by COB 15 December 1986.

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3. I also encourage you to phone in suggestions for the agenda and names of volunteers to make opening presentations. It would be helpful to have your comments for the next meeting by Thursday, 11 December 1986.

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Attachment

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Europe

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SUBJECT: November Warning and Forecast Report

Western Europe After Reykjavik

1. Discussion. Despite continued popular misgivings in Western Europe about US commitment to arms control and adherence to SDI, the debate among Allied governments has undergone a decisive shift -- away from pushing arms control issues and toward a sober reassessment of NATO security policy. The nuclear zero option raises grave doubts among our closest allies about our consideration of their separate security interests and reinvigorates old fears about US decoupling from Western Europe. In short, Reykjavik frightened the Center-Right in Western Europe even more than it alienated the Left.

The domestic repercussions of Reykjavik were unsettling but have not translated into significant gains for the Left.

- UK. Mrs. Thatcher's efforts to dramatize the irresponsibility of Labor's security program and defend her government's commitment to Trident were undermined by Reykjavik. She returned from Camp David somewhat strengthened, however, and better armed to counter Labor's line that Reykjavik vindicates its own unilateralist prescriptions. Owing chiefly to defections from the SDP/Liberal alliance over security issues, the British Left has actually lost considerable ground in recent polls.

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- West Germany. In addition to raising new fears of US decoupling, Reykjavik has highlighted differences within the CDU over how these arms control proposals, particularly a possible US-Soviet INF accord, would affect German security. The SPD, battered by the Hamburg elections and the latest turn of the Neue Heimat scandal, has been unable to capitalize on post-Reykjavik anxieties among the population at large.
- France. Government officials and party leaders across the political spectrum are expressing dismay at the ballistic missile zero option and the erosion of European confidence in American leadership. They also fear that any follow-on to the Reykjavik proposals could undermine the domestic consensus on defense issues. For now, though, the main impact has been to strengthen French commitment to its own force de frappe, as well as to a credible NATO deterrent posture.

For the immediate future, our West European allies will be preoccupied with issues of nuclear deterrence and NATO strategy and hence will be less eager to press for new US-Soviet arms agreements. But confidence in American leadership has been badly shaken, particularly among those most favorably disposed toward us.

The perceived danger of a US-Soviet nuclear condominium has already stimulated European collaboration on security issues. Given the meager results of earlier collaborative efforts through the West European Union, however, the new trilateral working group is not likely to go much beyond its immediate goal of exerting pressure on the US to avert a repetition of Reykjavik. Either individually or in concert, the West Europeans will continue to press hard for improved prior consultations -- like the Nitze visits earlier in the year, rather than the post-Reykjavik briefings on a fait accompli. Their major efforts will be to press us to:

- reaffirm the nuclear deterrent as the underpinning of the Atlantic Alliance;
- abandon the nuclear zero option (though a 50 percent reduction might be acceptable);
- postpone talk of sweeping cuts in ballistic missiles until agreement on reducing conventional and tactical forces in Europe is secured;
- consider major INF reductions only when there is a firm agreement for a follow-on reduction of SRINF; and
- address more urgently the conventional force imbalance in Europe, working out some compromise to accommodate French opposition to bloc-to-bloc negotiations.

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The Soviet propaganda machinery, meanwhile, has been thrown into some disarray by Reykjavik's aftermath. To link or not to link SDI to progress on arms control has been the chief question since Reykjavik, and the present stress on linkage runs the risk of destroying the propaganda gains the Soviets had accrued over the past year. More basically, the "we Europeans" theme lacks all plausibility coming from a Soviet leader who so recently bypassed Europe to table sweeping proposals in bilateral talks with the US; and the Soviets cannot be pleased with the emerging debate on nuclear deterrence and NATO strategy now current in West European capitals. For now, the Soviets have exchanged the carrot for the stick, exerting heavy-handed pressure on the Dutch to halt INF deployment and criticizing Kohl for his stand in favor of nuclear deterrence. If US-Soviet arms negotiations stall and the public mood in Europe reverts to form, however, the Soviets again may find a receptive audience and launch another "peace offensive."

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